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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
to expand itself to the limit of its logic in an attempt to align the law with what is be-
lieved to be the public sentiment. To the other extreme, however, it reflects the anomaly
of judges who, as triers of fact and law, render a verdict flatly in the face of both, ap-
parently not realizing that "the public policy as expressed by legislative acts is not a
matter for the courts. Their duty is to apply the law as they find it."40
Demands for legalizing euthanasia coupled with results similar to People v.
Werner justify a closer scrutiny of the present law as it applies to "mercy-killers."
Recent efforts in both England and the United States to re-classify those acts which
should be punishable amply demonstrate that the trend of modem criminal law is to
utilize punishment discriminately. 41 The manner in which both judges and juries are
now disposing of euthanasia cases further exemplifies this trend. Yet their disposition
of the cases is inadequate by present legal standards since euthanasia falls under the
classification of "premeditated homicide." This dichotomy necessitates a reform of
the law. Legislators could conceivably take mercy-killing entirely outside the scope of
criminal law, and thereby fulfill the aims of those advocating the legalization of
euthanasia. But in doing so, they are tacitly giving ethical approval to the act. A far
better approach would be to leave "involuntary" euthanasia under the full condemna-
tion of the criminal law, while at the same time recognizing the element of motive by
providing "voluntary" euthanasia with its own special niche in the law. Since a lesser
punishment would still attach, ethical approval would be withheld, the crime merely
being classified as less reprehensible than other forms of premeditated homicide. This
should eliminate the widespread and concerted refusal to enforce the penalties against
mercy-killers, and thereby bring the actual status of the mercy-killer back into juxta-
position with his conceptual status.
John C. Hirschfeld
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PROBABLE CAUSE - TIP OF INFORMER HELD PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT. - Petitioner was arrested without a warrant
by a federal narcotics agent. Sole justification for the arrest, pursuant to the Narcotics
Control Act of 1956,1 was information from a paid informer of the Narcotics Bureau
who had proved reliable during six months of association with arresting officers. The
informer's description of the petitioner, including dress, baggage, and manner of
walking, and his prediction of the petitioner's time of arrival at the point of arrest,
were detailed and accurate. The arresting officers searched petitioner immediately after
the arrest and seized narcotics and implements used in narcotics addiction. At trial
petitioner moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that the search was incident
to an illegal arrest. Motion was denied by the trial court and petitioner's subsequent
conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals. On petition for writ of certiorari, held:
affirmed. Information from a reliable informer may be probable cause for arrest without
a warrant. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
An arrest without a warrant can only be made upon probable cause, and evidence
seized incident to an invalid arrest is not admissible in the federal courts.2 With some
dicta to the contrary,a probable cause for arrest or for search without a warrant does
not require evidence sufficient for conviction. 4 Probable cause has been interpreted to
89 See People ex rel. Milburn v. Nierstheimer, 401 111. 465, 82 N.E.2d 438 (1948); People v.
Lueckfield, 396 Ill. 520, 72 N.E.2d 198 (1947).
40 Holmstedt v. Holmstedt, 383 M11. 290, 49 N.E.2d 25, 28 (1943).
41 See Silving, supra note 2, at 350.
1 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. V, 1958).
2 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3 See, e.g., Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932).
4 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
212 (1813).
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mean reasonable grounds under the circumstances. 5 The existence of probable cause
has been found where the officer's information was drawn from his personal knowledge 6
or observation, 7 or where guilt has been reasonably inferred from the suspect's flight 8
Statutes defining the arrest power of narcotics agents9 and agents of the FBI10 do not
enlarge the construction of probable cause in the fourth amendment." However, a
recent Fifth Circuit decision has construed the Narcotics Control Act as eliminating the
necessity for a judicial determination of probable cause and has upheld an arrest made
without a warrant two weeks after the arresting officer had sufficient information to
justify issuance of a warrant.
12
The courts have tended to test probable cause for arrest without a warrant by de-
ciding a posteriori whether a warrant could have been issued on the basis of the infor-
mation possessed by the officer before the arrest.' 3 If that test is applied, mere "belief"
by the officers 14 or information from undisclosed informers15 does not constitute
probable cause.
Approval of arrests made on the uncorroborated "tips" of informers has been re-
sisted by federal courts regardless of how accurate the information proved to be in the
subsequent search and seizure.' 6 An exception has been made in one case where in-
formation later proved to be "reliable and positive."' 7 In those cases which approve
arrests made without a warrant, the probable cause on which the arrest was based
usually involved corroboration by officers of the data given them by informers. In Wis-
niewski v. United States,'8 for instance, officers observed the suspect's criminal activity
before arrest. In Ard v. United States,19 Husty v. United States,20 and Carroll v.
United States,2 1 officers had prior personal knowledge of the suspects' criminal activity;
and in United States v. Li Fat Tong,22 the suspect had a record of several previous
arrests and admitted his guilt before he was arrested. These cases frequently included
dicta that information from informers would not, standing alone, justify arrest.28 In
several instances personal observation by officers has not validated an arrest made
after an investigation when the investigation was initiated as a result of a "tip" which
the courts considered unreliable.
24
The instant decision adds prestige to the informer's role by recognizing his word as
a basis of probable cause, subject to confirmation by the arresting officer. It appears
G Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
6 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7 United States v. Kansco, 252 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1958).
8 United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied sub nom. Cyrne v. United
States, 326 U.S. 727 (1945).
9 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. V, 1958) ("reasonable grounds").
10 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1952).
11 United States v. Volkell, 251 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 962 (1958);
United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1957); United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639
(W.D. Ky. 1931); cf. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
12 Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958); cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950).
13 Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Horton, 86 F.
Supp. 92 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
'4 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
15 Schencks v. United States, 2 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
16 Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Castle, 138 F. Supp.
436 (D.D.C. 1955). But see Wrightson v. United States, 236 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United
States v. Jackson, 159 F. Supp. 845 (D.D.C. 1958).
17 King v. United States, 1 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1924).
18 47 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1931).
19 54 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 550 (1932).
20 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
21 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
22 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1953).
24 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. Lee, 83 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1936); Wakkuri v. United States, 67 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1933).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
that the officer must both first believe that the informer is reliable, and then confirm
by personal observation at least part of what the informer tells him. However, this
personal observation need not be of criminal activity. The officer is apparently per-
mitted to infer that the informer's prediction that a crime will be committed is accurate
if other detailed descriptive information proves to be accurate.
The instant decision leaves indefinite the precise legal status of informers in
federal law enforcement. However, the right to report criminal activity, and to be
free from intimidation 25 or civil prosecution 26 as a result, is firmly established. The
government has been required to disclose the names of informers when such informa-
tion is necessary for an adequate defense,27 when the informer's words.have been re-
peated in testimony, 28 or when the informer has been used to trap the defendant.2 9 In
the absence of one of these circumstances, "public policy forbids disclosure of an in-
former's identity." 0
Conceding the necessity for prompt action in many narcotics cases, there is no
necessity for pre-empting judicial determination of probable cause where, as in this
case, there is time and opportunity to obtain a warrant. The statute defining the arrest
power of FBI agents3l has been construed more narrowly than the provisions of the
Narcotics Control Act 32 although the language is almost identical.33 This may indicate
that the judiciary considers narcotics violations more critical than other federal crimes.
There is, however, the danger that law enforcement officials will ignore constitutional
safeguards when the courts give them the opportunity.3 4 An officer employed to invade
privacy is not the most reliable judge of when to respect it.
Thomas L. Shaffer
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE - DISQUALIFICATION - RESIGNATION PURSUANT
TO SENIORITY PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT PRECLUDES EM-
PLOYEE FROM COMPENSATION. - Claimant, though a member of the international,
was a non-member of a local union, working as a moving picture projectionist under
a permit issued by the local union. He resigned his position in obedience to an order
of the local union's business agent issued pursuant to a seniority regulation which
provided that non-members had no seniority status in the local union and were subject
to being displaced by any local union member unemployed through no fault of his
own. The regulation was part of a collective bargaining agreement between the em-
ployer and the local union; the employer was required to comply strictly with the
regulation in making all changes of employees. Claimant subsequently applied for work
at the state employment office and filed a claim for benefits, which was granted by the
Commissioner of Employment Security. On certiorari, held, reversed. Employment dis-
continued in accordance with seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
25 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
26 Vogel v. Grauz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884).
27 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
28 United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
29 Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955).
30 Scher v. United States, 303 U.S. 251 (1938); cf. Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952
(5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947); Nichols v. United States, 176 F.2d 431 (8th Cir.
1949).
31 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1952).
32 70 Stat 570 (1956), 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. V, 1958).
33 United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629
(2d Cir. 1950).
34 Cf. the detailed statistical survey of arrest practices in seven eastern states in Tresolini,
Taylor & Barnett, Arrest Without Warrant: Extent and Social Implications, 46 J. CRrM. L., C. & P. S.
187 (1955).
